BIBLIOGRAPHY MEJIA, RONAH LYN ...

BIBLIOGRAPHY

MEJIA, RONAH LYN S. APRIL 2011. Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes
between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote. Benguet State University, La Trinidad,
Benguet.

Adviser: Leopoldo N. Tagarino, MRSM (Agribusiness)
ABSTRACT


This study was conducted to identify the different chains of chayote in the spot market
and to determine the coordination mechanisms and attributes adopted by the different chain
actors, particularly at La Trinidad, Benguet; Urdaneta City, Pangasinan; and Metro Manila.

There were a total of 173 respondents from the different groups of actors in the spot
market chain. Majority of them are married and have attained high school and college level.
Majority of the respondents were not affiliated to any related to vegetable trading business and
most are engaged one to five years in business.
There were several different spot market chains for chayote. All of the chains started
from the producers in Benguet and ended to the different consumers in La Trinidad, Benguet;
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan and Metro, Manila.
In the coordination mechanisms and attributes, the operational resource sharing result
showed that most of the respondents do not share investments in their business operation. In
strategic resource sharing, majority sometimes share their strategies to improve their operation,
similar with information sharing. The sharing of risk and reward in business transactions, all of
the actors sometimes have equal sharing of risks and rewards. The decision style, most of the
respondents decide more themselves about their business operation. The level of control of the



respondents in business operation is low. In comprehensive selection procedure all the
respondents agree to the different criteria used in choosing the seller or buyer of chayote.
However, in socialization, communication to the buyers is mainly for business.

For better operation, it is recommended to improve in decision making to obtain the
expected quality; level of control and socialization between the actors in the spot market chain
should be strengthened.



1



INTRODUCTION

Rationale
Province of Benguet has thirteen (13) municipalities that producing chayote.
Agriculture has been traditional service of employment for most of the people here. As
such, agricultural is the focal area of economic stability in this place. Thus, chayote
production or cash crop production is the center of activity of farmers in the locality
(Ancestral Domain Management Plan, 1999).
Chayote (Sechium edule Swarts) is one of the commercially grown fruit chayote
by most farmers in Benguet. But this crop was not been considered in the priority crops.
It is because it is not hard to plant thus, up the present limited resources has conducted on
chayote in the University in the country. According to Payangdo (2008) growing chayote
is a profitable venture since chayote production does not require intensive application of
pesticides as compared to the other chayote crops. The bulk of investment inputs during
the first year of operation were the cost of clearing, post hauling, wire, wiring, seeds and
a minimal application of inorganic fertilizer augmented with chicken manure. The
Municipal Agriculture office (MAO) in Benguet reported that chayote has the total
annual production of 55,833.18 Mt or 45.82 mt/ha. The Total area planted accounts to
831.46 has (Benguet Commodity Profile, 2009).
Supply chain management is a complex field of study. Beers et al., (1998) stated
that supply chain involve transactional, behavioral and institutional in context. As a
network of interconnected activities of individuals operating independently but dependent
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
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on the supply of goods and services from other individual. The fresh chayote industry as
a supply chains involves number of different groups of people, institutions, and
processes. The people (organizations) are the chain actors performing different functions
in the flow of goods; operate the business independently and manage intra- and inter-
organizational relationships; and the exchange processes involve formal and informal
coordination of activities and information.
Coordination mechanism is employed along the chain. Xu and Beamon (2006),
coordination within a supply chain is strategic response to the problems that arise from
inter-organizational dependencies within the chain. Coordination mechanisms may be
quite specific, such as different kind of code management systems to control changes to
software, or quite general, such as hierarchies or markets to manage assignment of
activities to actors (or other resource assignment problems (Crowston, 2008). Malone and
Crowston (1994) identify several common dependencies and analyze coordination
mechanisms to manage them including goal decomposition, resource allocation and
synchronization. In general, there are many different mechanisms that could address the
same problem. The taxonomy of dependencies serves as a way to organize coordination
mechanisms. Viewing dependency as a relationship between activities originated in the
field of artificial intelligence. From this perspective, coordination is defined as the
“process of managing dependencies (Malone and Crowston, 1994). This alternative
perspective led to a new set of coordination mechanisms defined by dependencies
between activities.
The study was conducted to find out how the different actors in the spot market
chains coordinate with each other.
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Statement of the Problem
Studying the coordination mechanisms along chayote supply chain was answered
the following questions:
1. What are the different chains of chayote in the spot market?
2. What are the coordination mechanisms and attributes adopted in the different
spot market chains?
Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study were as follows:
1. To identify the different chains of chayote in the spot market.
2. To determine the coordination mechanism and attributes adopted in the
different spot market chains such as:

3. To test whether there was significant difference between and among actors’
in the coordination mechanisms and attributes adopted.

Importance of the Study
In the Philippines, agricultural commodity supply chains researches become a
research priority agenda for industry development. Owe the changing market
environment in fresh chayote sector; analyzing the coordination mechanisms in the spot
market chain is a prime consideration. Supply chain management research and
development is a growing concern for industry development particularly in the fresh
chayote. Interests on the endeavor gained grounds to deal with as the market competition
increases and to improve efficiencies. The result of the study would in one way or
another could be a source of information to explain the behavior of actors in the spot
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
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market. That is, the knowledge about the association of coordination mechanisms and
attributes, and performance in spot market transactions for chayote.

Scope and Delimitation
The scope of this study focused on the coordination mechanisms of actors in the
production and marketing flow of chayote in the informal market. This study was
conducted on the selected trading areas such as La Trinidad Trading Post, Metro Manila
area and Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.






























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REVIEW OF LITERATURE


Supply Chain Managements

Every product has its own unique supply chain, according to Lele as cited by Batt
(2004); supply chain itself is often long and protracted, involving a large number of
market intermediaries. In other instances, Waters (2003) describes supply chain as the
series of activities in organizations that materials move through on their journey from
initial suppliers to final customers. Supply chain exit to overcome the gaps created when
supplies are some distance away from customers. This is a sequence of events intended to
satisfy the customer.
Supply chain is a network of physical and decision making activities connected
by material and information flows that cross organizational boundaries (Van der Vorst
2000). According to Lambert and Cooper (2000), there are four main characteristics of a
supply chain: First, it goes through several stages of increasing intra- and inter-
organizational, vertical coordination. Second, it includes many independent firms,
suggesting that managerial relationship is essential. Third, a supply chain includes a bi-
directional flow of products and information and the managerial and operational
activities. Fourth, chain members aim to fulfill the goals to provide high customer value
with an optimal use of resources. Supply chain means the process of planning,
implementing and controlling the efficient, cost effective flow and storage of raw
materials, in-process inventory, finished goods and related information from the point-of-
origin to point of final consumption for the purpose of conforming to customer
requirements (Council of Logistics Management, 1986).
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Supply chain is a dual flow of products and information. It is the drive to meet the
central needs of the consumer and it stresses the importance of the relationships between
participants in the marketing system. However, the tendency is often focus solely on the
immediate economic aspects when firms are building supply chains (Champion and
Fearne, 2001).
Coordination Mechanisms
The supply chain operations mean the exchange of goods, value, services and
information. That within the exchange processes, there are activities which are informally
undertaken, and that the coordination mechanisms are assumed to exist between the
supply chain actors. Hence, this study will examine the coordination mechanisms adopted
in the fresh chayotes sector supply chain using the following mechanisms: monitoring
(Williamson, 1975; Klein et al., 1978), communication (Schroder and Mavondo, 1995);
resource sharing structure, risk and incentive sharing, decision style, level of control,
comprehensive selection procedures and socialization (Malone, 1987).
Coordination within a supply chain is a strategic response to the challenges that
arise from dependencies. A coordination mechanism is a set of methods used to manage
interdependence between organizations. By definition, there are actors, entities and
processes that interact to execute supply chain objectives. Thompson (1967) identifies
different coordination mechanisms that are used to respond to different levels of
interdependencies between organizations, and categorizes these interdependencies as
pooled, sequential, or reciprocal. Corresponding to each kind of interdependence,
Thompson (1967) identifies three coordination mechanisms: standardization, plan, and
mutual adjustment. Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koeing (1976) extend the Thompson
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framework by adding a fourth type of interdependency: team arrangement, in which
partners work jointly and simultaneously. In their research, authors identify three kinds of
coordination mechanisms: (1) impersonal (plans and rules), (2) personal (vertical
supervision), and (3) group (formal and informal meetings) and observe that as the level
of interdependence increases (from pooled to team arrangement), so too does the need for
group coordination.
Coordination Mechanism Attributes
In integrated systems or managed coordination, firms work with mutual interest in
mind, build long-term relationships, work towards shared benefits, share information
openly, and thrive for stability and show independence. The ability to respond quickly to
the needs of the market is a key factor in ensuring the survival of the firm over time.
Related to the difficulty of spot markets conveying accurate information is the speed of
information flows and the rate of adoption with different coordination mechanisms.
Negotiated coordination results in more rapid transmission of information between
economic stages and consequently enhanced ability of the system to adjust to changing
consumer demands, economic conditions, or technological improvements (Schrader and
Boehlje, 1996).
McCann and Galbrath (1981) analyzed coordination strategies on the bases of
three dimensions: 1. formality (from informal personal meetings to more formal
arrangement; 2. level of control; and 3. decision localization (centralized or
decentralized). According to the authors, an increase in dependency will cause an
increase in formality, level of control, and centrality. Malone (1987) pointed out that
there are two attributes associated with different coordination structures: 1. information
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structure (how members share, perceive, and communicate information) and 2. decision
function (how members decide what actions to take). Within the decision function, there
are two classes: centralized and decentralized. The centralized decision, one firm has
primary control and decentralized style, each firm makes its decisions autonomously.
Another important dimension to consider in supply chain coordination, where risks and
benefits define the need for coordination, is how to allocate the benefits arising from
coordination and which parties absorb the risks. Each organization seeks to implement
coordination mechanisms that increase benefits and reduce risk. A framework utilizing
four attributes will be used to differentiate the various coordination mechanisms: resource
sharing structure; decision style; level of control and; risk/reward sharing (Xu and
Beamon, 2006).
Resource sharing structure. Malone (1987) limited consideration to information
sharing. Since there are other resources to be shared and communicated within the
context of coordination, the information sharing is extended to include all other resources
shared. This dimension is defined as resource sharing structure, and follows the
classification given by Varamaki and Vesalainen (2003) as:
• no resource sharing;
• operational resource sharing, such as communications between, operation
levels, sharing operational information such as point-of-sale (POS) data, or pooling
operational resources in group problem solving;
• information resource sharing, such as communication between managers
in the same function from different firms, to achieve consistency or jointly developing
inventory and production plans; and
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• strategic resource sharing, such as forming strategic alliances, forming
strategic level meeting, jointly creating strategic plans, sharing strategic information, or
jointly investing resources to make strategic advances, especially in the area of research
and development.
Risk and reward sharing. Risk and reward sharing describes the characteristics of
the selected incentive system. There are two main types of sharing methods: fair and
unfair. A fair condition occurs when one firm undertakes more risk than do other firms in
the relationships, but receives more benefits from coordination. An unfair condition
arises when one firm undertakes less risk but enjoys greater benefits, or when one firm
undertakes greater risks with fewer benefits (Xu and Beamon, 2006).
Decision style. For the decision function, there are two main styles: centralized
and decentralized. The centralized decision style, one firm has primary control and
decentralized style, each firm makes its decisions autonomously (Xu and Beamon, 2006).
Level of control. Control is the process of monitoring activities to ensure they are
being accomplished as planned and to correct any significant deviations (Robbins, 1988).
Control has two levels: high and low. A high level of control corresponds to strict activity
monitoring and control. In this case, the coordinating firms develop detailed and strict
rules, routines, and monitoring systems to control other firm’s behavior, for the purpose
of detecting opportunistic risk. A low level of control corresponds little to no monitoring
and control (Xu and Beamon, 2006).
Williamson (1975) and Klein et al. (1978) proposed monitoring as an effective
mechanism to suppress quasi-rent seeking, in seeking mainly the information asymmetry
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problem. Its primary purpose is to detect irregularities and to undertake sanctions against
unwanted behavior.
Comprehensive selection procedures. Constitute a coordinating mechanism that
increases the likelihood that a suitable trading partner will be identified beforehand,
thereby making it easier to cooperate in the future.
Socialization. as a subscribing factor of opportunism is a powerful way to
promote goal congruence. Both natural socialization and more deliberate socialization
tactics (e.g. active promotion of a corporate philosophy) influence the business
atmosphere and set bounds of acceptance.

Decision Style

1. Centralized

Resource Sharing
2. Decentralized

Structure

Risk and Reward
Coordination
1. No resource sharing


Mechanism
Sharing
2. Operational resource
Attributes
1. Fair
sharing
2. Unfair
3. Tactical resource
Level of Control

sharing
1. High level
4. Strategic resource
3. Unfair
2. Low level
sharing

Figure 1. Coordination mechanisms and attributes
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Schroder and Mavondo (1995) suggested that current communication mechanisms
within the food system are inadequate to meet the changing needs of buyers of
agricultural commodities.
Definition of Terms

Assembler –wholesaler – they are the one who assemble the product to make t
large quantity.

Farmers / producers - are who produces the commodity.

Retailer – individuals who market chayote directly to the ultimate consumers.

Spot market - place where the product are being delivered and sold.

Trucker – in charge of carrying the product to put in the supermarket.
Wholesaler – refers to the middleman who directly sells chayote to retailers in
wholesale price.

Conceptual Framework

In the frame of this study (figure 2), the supply chain management definition as a
network of interconnected activities of individuals operating independently but dependent
on the supply of goods and services.

This study will consider the different coordination mechanism attributes of such
as resource sharing structure, risk and reward sharing, level of control, decision style
performed by the different chain actors such as the farmers, assembler-wholesalers,
trucker-wholesalers, wholesalers, wholesalers-retailers, retailers and its expected outcome

Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
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Chain Actors

Farmers

Coordination Mechanism
Attributes
Expected outcome
Asse mbler-
R
esource sharing structure
Wholesalers
Different chains of

chayote in the spot


market.
Risk a nd reward sharing
Trucker-Wholesalers


Coordination

Level of control

mechanisms
Wholesalers
adopted in the

Decision style
different spot

market chains.

Wholesaler-Retailers




Retailers


Figure 2. Conceptual framework






Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
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METHODOLOGY
Locale and Time of the Study
The study was conducted in La Trinidad, Benguet which served as the primary
markets (assembly/collection). Urdaneta Pangasinan as secondary markets (distribution);
tertiary markets in Metro Manila such as Balintawak, Novaliches, Kamuning, Mega Q,
Nepa Q, Blumentritt, Basilio. The research was conducted on November 2010 to January
2011.
Respondents of the Study
The respondents represent the major actors in the fresh chayotes supply chain.
From the 30 farmers’ response to whom the chayotes were sold, the assembly group was
identified but a limited number were interviewed due to difficulty in locating them.
Additional assemblers were interviewed to make a total sample of 35. Similarly, the same
approach was used to identify respondents in the distribution group and a total of 60 were
interviewed. The last group interview comprised 48 retailers in the wet markets. Overall,
the research has a total sample of 173 respondents.
Table 1. Distribution of sample size according to respondent groups
RESPONDENTS
TOTAL SAMPLE SIZE
Producers/ Farmers
30
Assemblers

• Assembler- wholesalers
19
• Financier- assembler- wholesalers
16
Distributors

• Trucker- wholesalers
11
• Wholesalers/ Wholesaler- retailers
49
Retailers
48
TOTAL
173


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Data Gathering Procedures
The study used a structured interview schedule. The interview schedule was pre-tested to
determine the validity of the questionnaire and to enhance thereafter.
Data Gathered
The data gathered were the profile of the actors and the coordination mechanism and
attributes adopted in the spot market chains. The mechanism and attributes are as follows:
(1) Resource sharing
1.1 Operational resource sharing
1.2 Strategic resource sharing
1.3 Information sharing
(2) Risk and reward sharing
(3) Decision making style
2.1 Centralized decision style
2.2 Decentralized decision style
(4) Level of control
(5) Comprehensive selection procedure
(6) Socialization
6.1 Natural socialization
6.2 Deliberate socialization



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Data Analysis
The data gathered was organized, summarized and classified according to the
objective of the study. The descriptive analyses used were: frequency counts, percentage,
average and mean average. Moreover, as to statistical test, chi-square and kruskal-wallis.















Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Demographic Profile of Respondents

The respondents profile of chayote according to socio demographic status from
La Trinidad to Manila. Table 2 presents the respondents characterized based on their age,
gender, marital status, religious affiliation and educational background.
Age. The findings in table 2, all of the respondents revealed their respective ages.
For wholesaler 33% was in the age bracket of less than 20 of age. Another 41% for
farmer age 21-30, 31% for assembler-wholesaler, 36% for trucker-wholesaler, 37%
wholesaler-retailer, 23% for retailer, while 44% for farmer-assembler- wholesaler age
from 31-40. The finding shows that the youngest and oldest respondents have the age of
20 to 60 respectively while the mean age was 36 years old. This implies that most of the
stakeholders engaged in chayote business are younger to Middle Ages.
Gender and marital status. It could be gleaned from the table 2 that there are more
female than male. In production, there are more than female, where as in the retailing
activities of the reversed situation. The results indicate the difference in the nature of
activities performed by the actors that hard works as compared less strenuous activities.
As to marital status, majority of the respondents are married while the rest are
either single, separated, widowed. This shows that married respondents are more
interested in the chayote business to augment income and the single respondents may
assume for employment.
Religious affiliation. Majority of respondents were catholic fallowed by
Protestants and the least are affiliated with other religious denomination.
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
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Educational background. Majority of the respondents: Farmers (47%), A-W
(47%), W-R (40%) and Retailers (60%) finished secondary education, while the A-W
(47%), F-A-W (50%), T-W (55%) and W (50%) attained college degrees. It could be
observed further that there are respondents in all groups have elementary education.

Therefore the results implied that education is an important factor in the chayote
production and trading business.
Table 2. Respondents profile
PRODUCTION
ASSEMBLY
DISTRIBUTION
RETAILING
CHARACTERISTICS
Farmer
A-W
F-A-W
T-W
W
W-R
Retailer
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
AGE














20 and below
0
0
2
11
0
0
0
0
3
21
3
9
0
0
21-30
14
47
6
32
3
19
4
36
5
36
13
37
11
23
31-40
10
33
5
26
7
44
5
45
1
7
12
34
10
21
41-50
5
17
3
16
4
25
1
9
3
21
2
6
18
38
51-60
1
3
3
16
2
13
1
9
2
14
3
9
7
15
60 and below
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
2
4
TOTAL
30
100
19
100
16 100
11
100
14
100 35 100
48
100
GENDER













Male
27
90
13
68
5
31
7
64
4
29
12
34
9
19
Female
3
10
6
32
11
69
4
36
10
71
23
66
39
81
TOTAL
30
100
19
100 16 100
11
100
14
100 35 100
48
100
MARITAL STATUS

Single
9
30
2
11
1
6
5
45
7
50
16
46
9
19
Married
21
70
17
89
14
88
6
55
6
43
18
51
38
79
Separated
0
0
0
0
1
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
Widow/er
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
7
1
3
0
0
TOTAL
30
100
19
100 16 100
11
100
14
100 35 100
48
100
RELIGION













Catholic
22
73
14
74
10
63
11
100
13
93
26
74
41
85
Protestant
8
27
3
16
5
31
0
0
2
14
7
20
5
10
Others
0
0
2
11
1
6
0
0
0
0
1
3
2
4
TOTAL
30
100
19
100 16 100
11
100
14
100 35 100
48
100

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Number of Years Engaged in Chayote Business
Table 3 shows the number of years the different actors venturing in chayote
business based from their role and function. Most of the respondents: A-W (42%), F-A-
W (38%), T-W (36%), W (43%), W-R (31%) are engaged 1-5 years, while the Farmer
(37%) and Retailer (28%). It could be observed further that in business respondents are
new in this business industry.

Organizational Affiliations of Respondents

Table 4 presented the affiliation of respondents to organization. The result shows that
majority of the respondents’ were not affiliated to any organization. However, there were few

respondents from the different groups that are appreciated to farmer’s organization
cooperatives and vendors association in their respective places of operation.
Table 3. Number of years engaged in chayote business
PRODUCTION
ASSEMBLY
DISTRIBUTION
RETAILING
YEARS

Farmer
A-W
F-A-W
T-W
W
W-R
Retailer
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
Below 1 year
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
0
6
43
5
14
2
5

1-5years
9
30
8
42
6
38
4
36
6
43
11
31
1
2

6-10 years
11
37
5
26
2
12
3
27
1
7
8
23
12
28

11-15 years
6
20
3
15
6
37
4
36
0
0
5
14
8
19

16-20 years
2
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
4
9

21-25 years
1
3
1
5
1
6
0
0
0
0
1
3
11
26

26-30 years
1
3
1
5
1
6
0
0
1
7
1
3
9
21

31andabove
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
9
1
2
TOTAL
30
100
19
100
16
100
11
100
14
100
35
100
48
100
LEGEND:
F- Farmer




W- Wholesaler
AW- Assembler-Wholesaler



WR- Wholesaler- Retailer
FAW- Financier-Assembler-Wholesaler


R- Retailer
TW- Trucker- Wholesaler

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Table 4. Organizational affiliation
PRODUCTION
ASSEMBLY
DISTRIBUTION
RETAILER
ORGANIZATION
Farmer
A-W
F-A-W
T-W
W
W-R
Retailer
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
Farmer's
Organization
3
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
14
0
0
0
0
Cooperative
2
7
2
11
4
25
3
27
1
7
6
17
2
4
Others
0
0
3
16
2
13
3
27
0
0
3
9
5
10
None
25
83
14
74
10
63
5
45
11
79
26
74
41
85

TOTAL
30
100
19 100
16
100
11 100 14 100 35 100
48
100
LEGEND:
F- Farmer




W- Wholesaler
AW- Assembler-Wholesaler



WR- Wholesaler- Retailer
FAW- Financier-Assembler-Wholesaler


R- Retailer
TW- Trucker- Wholesaler


Spot Market Chain
and Location for Chayote


Figure 3a illustrates the different chain actors involved in the production,
procurement and selling of chayote in the spot market. It shows the flow of chayote’s
from its point of production up to the end user/consumer. In general, it describes the
different chains that the chayote goes to, from the point of production from the different
channels up to the end consumer.

Most of the production group from La Trinidad, Benguet sold their produce to the
assembly group of the different spot markets such as in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, La
Trinidad, Benguet and Metro Manila. Majority of these assembly groups sold their
chayote to the trucker-wholesalers while there are some selling also to the distribution
and retailing groups.
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

20

F
F
PTC
LTVTP




A-W
F-A-W
A-W
F-A-W



LTVTP
LTVTP
BALINTAWAK
BALINTAWAK
A-W



F-A-W-R




PTC

LTVTP








T-W

T-W
BALINTAWAK

LTVTP


A-W

W
W
URDANETA, PANG.
BALINTAWAK

BALINTAWAK





F-A-W
W-R
W-R
URDANETA, PANG.
LTVTP
W

METRO MANILA


METRO MANILA




W-R
R

URDANETA, PANG.
LTVTP
R



METRO MANILA
W-R


METRO MANILA
CONSUMERS
URDANETA, PANG.
R
URDANETA, PANG.
CONSUMERS

LTVTP
CONSUMERS

METRO MANILA





LEGEND:
F (Farmer) A-W (Assembler-Wholesaler)
F-A-W (Financier- Assembler-Wholesaler)
F-A-W-R (Financier-Assembler-Wholesaler-Retailer) T-W (Trucker-Wholesaler)

W (Wholesaler
W-R (Wholesaler-Retailer)
R (Retailer)
LTVTP (La Trinidad Chayote Trading Post)

Metro Manila

PTC (Private Trading Center)

Balintawak

Urdaneta, Pangasinan


Figure 3a. Spot market chains and location for chayote
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

21


The distribution groups specifically the trucker-wholesalers from La Trinidad
delivers the chayote to Urdaneta City, Pangasinan and Balintawak, Quezon City and
distributes the products to the buyers such as the wholesalers, wholesaler-retailers and
retailers within these trading center. The buyers of these trucker-wholesalers in
Balintawak may come from the different spot markets of Metro Manila. The distribution
groups ultimately sold their chayote to the retailing group however, the trading of chayote
also happen among the different actors within the distribution groups. Lastly, the retailing
group from the different spot markets sold their chayote to the consumers of these
different trading centers.
In the figure 3b shows the complexities as the number of actors involved in the
movement product. In view, there were several spot market chain can be drawn as
exhibited in Figure 3b.
Spot market chain 1, 2, and 3 it illustrate in the La Trinidad, Benguet and Baguio
City.
1. Chain 1 illustrates the direct selling of chayote from the farmers to the retailer
and to the consumers. This situation is applicable in La Trinidad.
2. It shows that from the producers in La Trinidad to the assembly (financier-
assembler-wholesaler-retailer) and directly sale to the retailer and last to consumer.

3. Chain 3 shows similarity in number two; the only difference is that instead of
farmer-assembler-wholesaler-retailers to retailer distribution, it is wholesaler-retailer to
retailer distribution and eventually the consumers.

Numbers 4 to 10 involves other outlet outside Benguet. (Balintawak, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, Novaliches, Libertad, Kamuning, Dapitan, Nepa Q).
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

22

1
FARMER
RETAILER
CONSUMERS


LTVTP
LTVTP

2
FARMER

F-A-W-R
RETAILER
CONSUMERS
LTVTP
LTVTP
LTVTP
LTVPTP
3
FARMER
W-R
R
CONSUMERS
LTVTP
LTVTP
LTVTP
4
FARMER
W
A-W
LTVTP
LTVTP
BALINTAWAK
CONSUMERS
W

BALINTAWAK
5
FARMER
T-W
AW
LTVTP
LTVTP
BALINTAWAK

CONSUMERS
6
FARMER
A-W
TW
LTVTP
LTVTP
URDANETA
CONSUMERS

7
FARMER
W
FAWR
LTVTP
LTVTP
LTVTP
CONSUMERS
R
URDANETA
8
FARMER
A-W
T-W
R
LTVTP
LTVTP
BALINTAWAK
BALINTAWAK,
NOVALICHES,
CONSUMERS
LIBERTAD,
KAMUNING,
DAPITAN,
9
FARMER
W-R
T-W
R
NEPA Q
LTVTP
LTVTP
BALINTAWAK
BALINTAWAK,
NOVALICHES,

CONSUMER S
LIBERTAD,
KAMUNING,

DAPITAN,
10
FARMER
F-A-W
A-W
W-R
CONSUMERS

NEPA Q
LTVTP
LTVTP
BALINTAWAK
BALINTAWAK
Figure 3b. Different spot market chains for chayote
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

23


It could be observed that from 4 to 10 the chayote was passing through different
channel before reaching ultimate consumers.
4. The farmers and wholesalers of La Trinidad Vegetable Trading Post deliver
their chayote fruit to the Assembler/wholesalers and wholesalers of Balintawak ‘till it
reaches the consumers.
5. The producer from LTVTP sell the chayote to trucker-wholesaler.From the
Assembler/wholesaler of balintawak which sometimes their regular buyer sells the
chayote it to ultimate consumers.
6. From the farmers of La Trinidad Vegetable Trading Post, the chayote was
delivered to Assembler/wholesaler and before it reaches the consumers it was first
handed to Trucker/wholesalers of Balintawak.
7. The chayote produced by the farmers of La Trinidad Vegetable Trading Post
was distributed through the different actors wholesalers to financier-assembler-
wholesaler-retailers from the financier-assembler-wholesaler.
8. The chain 8 was similar to chain 6, that from farmers to consumers, but their
difference is that the presence of retailers on some spot markets.

9. Chain 9 despites how the chayote from farmers of LTVTP goes to households,
the main consumers. From farmers to wholesaler-retailer to trucker-wholesaler of
Balintawak to the retailers of Balintawak, Nova., Libertad, Kamuning, Dapitan and Nepa
Q until it reaches the consumers.

10. The last chain shows the chayote journey from the farmers and financier-
assembler-wholesaler of La Trinidad assembler-wholesaler and wholesaler-retailer of
Balintawak and to the consumers.

Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

24

Coordination Mechanisms

Coordinating mechanisms facilitate valuable cooperation, and give emphasize to
the importance of understanding the causes and forms of opportunism by identifying the
specific governance strategy to satisfy the negative effects of such behavior. Depending
on the underlying situation under which the specific transaction occurs, different
coordinating procedure contribute unequally well to the optimization of the exchange
relationship.
Resource Sharing Structure

Operational resource sharing. Table 5a presents the distribution of respondents
according to coordination mechanism. Majority of the trucker-wholesalers (36%),
wholesalers (71%), wholesaler-retailers (34%), and retailers (56%) strongly disagreed
that buyers support in procurement investment. However, there are respondents from all
groups who are undecided. Looking into the average, some of the actors responded on the
disagreement to such support for specific production/ procurement investment. It was
further explained by the mean average of 2.4, statistically the result showed that there
was insignificant differences (0.085). Therefore, this proves that the actors make
investment for their business.
In the second statement validates statement no.1 whether the seller and buyer
share investment, reveals that majority of the respondents strongly disagree in sharing
investment production/procurement operation. Average reveals that all actors indicated
their disagreement to such sharing investment production/procurement operation.


Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011


25

Table 5a. Coordination mechanisms along operational resource sharing

1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
A. Farmer










1. Buyer supports me for specific
production/procurement investments.
7
23
10
33
9
30
1
3
3
10
2

2. We share investment in production/procurement
operation.
12
40
9
30
7
0
1
3
1
3
2

3. I extend support to the buyer in our business
operation.
4
13
7
23
9
30
7
23
3
10
3

4. The buyer extend credit assistance in the
production/procurement of chayotes.
6
20
9
30
6
20
5
17
4
13
3

B. Assembler-wholesaler

1. Buyer supports me for specific
production/procurement investments.
3
16
6
32
6
32
3
16
1
5
3

2. We share investment in production/procurement
operation.
4
21
6
32
5
26
3
16
1
5
3

3. I extend support to the buyer in our business
operation.
1
5
4
21
7
37
4
21
3
16
3

4. The buyer extend credit assistance in the
production/procurement of chayotes.
4
21
6
32
2
11
6
32
1
5
3

C. Financier-Assembler-Wholesaler






1. Buyer supports me for specific
production/procurement investments.
4
25
2
13
4
25
3
19
3
19
3

2. We share investment in production/procurement
operation.
5
31
3
19
3
19
4
25
1
6
3

3. I extend support to the buyer in our business
operation.
2
13
4
25
4
25
3
19
3
19
3

4. The buyer extend credit assistance in the
production/procurement of chayotes.
7
44
2
13
4
25
1
6
2
13
2

D. Trucker-wholesaler

1. Buyer supports me for specific
production/procurement investments.
4
36
3
27
1
9
2
18
1
9
2

2. We share investment in production/procurement
operation.
9
82
0
0
2
18
0
0
0
0
1

3. I extend support to the buyer in our business
operation.
2
18
0
0
3
27
5
45
1
9
3

4. The buyer extend credit assistance in the
production/procurement of chayotes.
4
36
1
9
3
27
3
27
0
0
2

Numerical value and descriptive equivalent 1 Strongly Disagree 2 Disagree 3 Undecided 4 Agree 5Strongly Agree
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

26

Table 5a. Continued . . .

1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
E. Wholesaler









1. Buyer supports me for specific
production/procurement investments.
10
71
2
14
1
7
1
7
0
0
2

2. We share investment in production/procurement
operation.
10
71
3
21
1
7
0
0
0
0
1

3. I extend support to the buyer in our business
operation.
3
21
2
14
6
43
2
14
1
7
3

4. The buyer extend credit assistance in the
production/procurement of chayotes.
6
43
2
14
3
21
2
14
1
7
2

F. Wholesaler-retailer

1. Buyer supports me for specific
production/procurement investments.
12
34
4
11
9
26
5
14
5
14
3

2. We share investment in production/procurement
operation.
17
49
6
17
5
14
5
14
2
6
2

3. I extend support to the buyer in our business
operation.
4
11
3
9
8
23
11
31
9
26
4

4. The buyer extend credit assistance in the
production/procurement of chayotes.
10
29
6
17
4
11
8
23
7
20
3

G. Retailer









1. Buyer supports me for specific
production/procurement investments.
27
56
2
4
8
17
7
15
4
8
2

2. We share investment in production/procurement
operation.
31
65
4
8
6
13
5
10
2
4
2

3. I extend support to the buyer in our business
operation.
11
23
9
19
15
31
9
19
4
8
3


4. The buyer extend credit assistance in the
production/procurement of chayotes.
24
50
5
10
8
17
6
13
3
6
2



Table 5b. Descriptive and test statistics of operational resource sharing

STATEMENT
MEAN
CHI-SQUARE
DF
ASYMP.SIG
1. The buyer and I jointly share production and
marketing strategies.
2.57
7.003
3
0.072

2. We jointly share investment to attain our business
goals.
1.94
16.94
3
0.001**

3. We plan/make strategies to improve our business
2.57
6.971
3
0.073
operation.
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

27

Farmers (30%) are undecided in supporting buyers in their business operation and
so with assembler-wholesalers (27%), financier-assembler-wholesalers (25%),
wholesalers (43%), and retailers (31%) while the trucker-wholesalers (45%) and
wholesaler-retailers (26%) agreed that actors support buyer in their business operation.
Average reveals that actors differ in supporting their buyers. It specify by the mean
average of 3.04 statistically. The finding showed that there was an insignificant
difference (0.106) among the different actors in supporting buyers. Hence, this confirms
that the actor supports buyers for their business.
In buyers’ credit assistance, all of respondent’s responses are undecided but
wholesaler-retailers (31%) and retailers (31%) extend credit assistance by their buyer.
However there was an extreme response of wholesalers. Furthermore, based on the
descriptive statistics implies that respondents disagreed (2.00) that their buyer extend
credit to the actors. There are significant differences (.004) among the different chain
actors in sharing investment. This finding proves that actors extend credit assistant by
their buyer.
Overall results confirm that the different actors are undecided concerning
operational resource sharing and in production/procurement operation. From the
statements asked, the situation evolving between assemblers and producer rely
mainly/basically in statement that buyer supports in production procurement investment.
The rationale, farmers seek for financial support from buyers due to lack of financial
capability to support their farm operation; however, the relationship seems to be
advantageous to farmers since the chayote production are financially secured in this
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

28

manner. More over for searching for a trader to sell their product was not the farmers’
concern eventually.
Strategic resource sharing. As shown in Table 6a, the sharing of investment
responses reveals that respondent’s farmers (36%), assembler-wholesalers (32%),
financier-assembler-wholesalers (38%), trucker-wholesalers (55%), wholesalers (71%),
wholesaler-retailers (57%) and retailers strongly disagreed of sharing investment to attain
their business goals. Looking into the frequency, all actors indicate disagreement to such
sharing investment. It specifies by the mean average of 1.94; statistically the result
showed that there were highly significant differences (0.001). This proves that some
actors share investment. Farmers (47%) disagreed that they jointly share in production
and marketing strategies, while trucker-wholesalers (36%), wholesalers (57%); retailers
(38%) strongly disagreed. There are respondents from the groups who are undecided.
Glancing into the average, some actors are undecided to such sharing of strategies. The
mean average of 2.57 showed that there was no significant difference (0.072). Therefore,
this confirms that the actors jointly share in production and marketing strategies’.
Making of strategies, all of the respondents never make strategies except to those
financier-assembler-wholesalers (25%) who make strategies. Average shows that some
actors sometimes plan/make strategies. It was indicated by the mean average of 2.57 and
the finding showed that there was insignificant difference (0.073). This proves that some
actors make strategies
Over all result showed that majority of the respondents are undecided in the
different criteria of operational resource sharing and some respondents disagreed in
actors who jointly share investment to attain their business goals.
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

29

It signifies that actors have not much acquainted in strategies to improve their
business operation.
Table 6a. Coordination mechanisms along strategic resource sharing
1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
A. Farmer










1. The buyer and I jointly share production and
marketing strategies.
1
3
14
47
9
30
4
13
2
7
3

2. We jointly share investment to attain our business
goals.
8
27
11
37
9
30
2
7
0
0
2

3. We plan/make strategies to improve our business
operation.
0
0
11
37
13
43
5
17
1
3
3

B. Assembler-Wholesaler

1. The buyer and I jointly share production and
marketing strategies.
3
16
1
5
8
42
6
32
1
5
3

2. We jointly share investment to attain our business
goals.
6
32
4
21
5
26
3
16
1
5
2

3. We plan/make strategies to improve our business
operation.
2
11
6
32
5
26
4
21
2
11
3

C. Farmer-Assembler-Wholesaler

1. The buyer and I jointly share production and
marketing strategies.
3
19
3
19
7
44
1
6
2
13
3

2. We jointly share investment to attain our business
goals.
6
38
3
19
2
13
4
25
1
6
2

3. We plan/make strategies to improve our business
operation.
4
25
2
13
4
25
4
25
2
13
3

D. Trucker-Wholesaler








1. The buyer and I jointly share production and
marketing strategies.
4
36
1
9
3
27
2
18
1
9
3

2. We jointly share investment to attain our business
goals.
6
55
2
18
3
27
0
0
0
0
2

3. We plan/make strategies to improve our business
operation.
5
45
1
9
3
27
1
9
1
9
2

Numerical value and descriptive equivalent 1 Strongly Disagree 2 Disagree 3 Undecided 4 Agree5 Strongly Agree

Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

30

Table 6a. Continued . . .
1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
% N % N %
E. Wholesaler

1. The buyer and I jointly share production
and marketing strategies.
8
57
0
0
2
14 3 21 1
7
2

2. We jointly share investment to attain our
business goals.
10 71
2
14
2
14 0
0
0
0
1

3. We plan/make strategies to improve our
business operation.
9
64
0
0
1
7
3 21 1
7
2

F. Wholesaler-Retailer

1. The buyer and I jointly share production
and marketing strategies.
8
23
9
26
9
26 7 20 2
6
3

2. We jointly share investment to attain our
business goals.
20 57
4
11
5
14 5 14 1
3
2

3. We plan/make strategies to improve our
business operation.
9
26
8
23
8
23 6 17 4 11
3

G. Retailer
1. The buyer and I jointly share production
and marketing strategies.
18 38 12 25
9
19 4
8
5 10
2

2. We jointly share investment to attain our
business goals.
33 69
7
15
4
8
4
8
0
0
2

3. We plan/make strategies to improve our
25 52
5
10
5
10 5 10 8 17
2
business operation.

Table 6b. Descriptive and test statistics of strategic resource sharing
STATEMENT
MEAN CHI- SQUARE
DF
ASYMP.SIGNIF.
1. The buyer and I jointly share production
and marketing strategies.
2.57
7.003
3
0.072

2. We jointly share investment to attain our
business goals.
1.94
16.935
3
0.001**

3. We plan/make strategies to improve our
2.57
6.971
3
0.730
business operation.
** Highly significant Numerical value and descriptive equivalent 1-1.8 Strongly Disagree
1.9-2.6 Disagree
2.7-3.4 Undecided 3.5-4.2 Agree 4.3-5 Strongly Agree
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

31

Information resource sharing. The findings in Table 7a, majority of the
respondents agreed on sharing production/procurement to their buyer while sometimes
for farmers (43%) and retailers (35%) strongly agreed. Glancing into the average
frequency, most actors sometimes share information to the buyer but for wholesaler-
retailers have an extreme point (agreed) to such sharing production/ procurement
information. It was indicated by the mean average of 3.28 statistically. The results
showed that there was insignificant difference. Therefore, this proves that actors
sometimes share information to the buyer.

The second statement validated no.1 that majority of the farmers (56%), financier-
assembler-wholesalers (31%), wholesalers (29%) and wholesaler-retailers (34%) are
undecided while assembler-wholesalers (32%) and trucker-wholesalers (45%) agreed on
sharing market information, however in frequency average there was extreme response of
wholesaler-retailers. It was indicated in the mean average of 2.97. The result showed that
there was highly significant difference (0.004). Therefore, this proves that some actors
share information.

Result showed that farmers (33%), assembler-wholesalers (32%), trucker-
wholesalers (36%) agreed, financier-assembler-wholesalers (56%) undecisive,
wholesalers (29%) and wholesaler-retailers (29%), retailers (33%) strongly disagree in
sharing information for their respective buyer. Looking into the average actors responded
that there was sharing of information but not always. It indicated by the mean average of
3.02. The results showed there was highly significant difference (.008). As a result,
confirm that some actors share information to their respective buyer.


Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011


32

Table 7a. Coordination mechanisms along information resource sharing
1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
A. Farmer










1. I share production/procurement information
(volume, cost, production schedules) to the buyers.

1
3
6
20
13
43
6
20
4
13
3
2. The buyer always share market information
(demand, supply, prices & cost).

0
0
4
12
19
56
3
10
4
13
3
3. We share information about production and
marketing schedules.

0
0
7
21
11
32
10
33
2
7
3
B. Assembler-Wholesaler

1. I share production/procurement information
(volume, cost, production schedules) to the buyers.

2
11
2
11
4
21
7
37
4
21
3
2. The buyer always share market information
(demand, supply, prices & cost).

2
11
2
11
5
26
6
32
4
21
3
3. We share information about production and
marketing schedules.

2
11
0
0
6
32
6
32
5
26
4
C. Financier-Assembler-Wholesaler

1. I share production/procurement information
(volume, cost, production schedules) to the buyers.

0
0
3
19
4
25
6
38
3
19
4
2. The buyer always share market information
(demand, supply, prices & cost).

0
0
3
19
5
31
5
31
3
19
4
3. We share information about production and
marketing schedules.

0
0
2
13
9
56
2
13
3
19
3
D. Trucker-Wholesaler








1. I share production/procurement information
(volume, cost, production schedules) to the buyers.

2
18
2
18
2
18
0
0
5
45
3
2. The buyer always share market information
(demand, supply, prices & cost).

2
18
2
18
2
18
3
27
2
18
3
3. We share information about production and
marketing schedules.

2
18
2
18
0
0
4
36
3
27
3
E. Wholesaler

1. I share production/procurement information
(volume, cost, production schedules) to the buyers.

3
21
3
21
2
14
3
21
3
21
3
2. The buyer always share market information
(demand, supply, prices & cost).

3
21
3
21
4
29
2
14
2
14
3
3. We share information about production and
marketing schedules.

4
29
6
43
1
7
2
14
1
7
2
Numerical value and descriptive equivalent 1 Strongly Disagree 2 Disagree 3 Undecided 4 Agree 5 Strongly Agree
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011


33

Table 7a. Continued . . .
1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
F. Wholesaler-Retailer


1. I share production/procurement information
(volume, cost, production schedules) to the buyers.
4
11
1
3
9
26
7
20
14
40
4

2. The buyer always share market information
(demand, supply, prices & cost).
7
20
4
11
12
34
4
11
8
23
3

3. We share information about production and
marketing schedules.
5
14
5
14
10
29
9
26
6
17
3

G. Retailer










1. I share production/procurement information
(volume, cost, production schedules) to the buyers.
17
35
5
10
4
8
12
25
10
21
3

2. The buyer always share market information
(demand, supply, prices & cost).
19
40
5
10
12
25
8
17
4
8
2

3. We share information about production and
marketing schedules.
16
33
9
19
10
21
7
15
6
13
3


Table 7b. Descriptive and test statistics
STATEMENT
MEAN
CHI- SQ.
DF
ASYMP. SIG.
1. I share production/procurement information (volume, cost, production
3.28
5.935
3
0.115
schedules) to the buyers.
2. The buyer always share market information (demand, supply, prices &
2.97
13.09
3
0.004**
cost).
3. We share information about production and marketing schedules.
3.02
11.89
3
0.008**
** Highly significant
Numerical value and descriptive equivalent
1-1.8 Strongly Disagree

1.9-2.6 Disagree


2.7-3.4 Undecided

3.5-4.2 Agree
4.3-5 Strongly Agree




Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

34

Risk and reward sharing. This portion discusses how the respondents divide risk and
benefit. Most of the respondents, farmers (50%); assembler-wholesalers (42%); trucker-
wholesalers (27%); wholesaler-retailers (31%) are undecided while, financier-assembler-
wholesalers (37%), wholesalers (43%) and retailers (29%) agreed.
In the average, financier-assembler-wholesaler extremely agreed that they and the buyers
share the same risk. It is futher validated by the mean average of 2.94. The result showed that
there is a significant difference (0.000) on the response on risk and reward sharing. Therefore,
this proves that the some actors share same risk.
In sharing of equal benefits with the buyer, farmers (36%), trucker-wholesalers
(45%), wholesalers (36%), retailers are indecisive but for assembler-wholesalers (47%),
financier-assembler-wholesalers (31%) and wholesaler-retailers (37%) agreed that they
and their buyers share equal benefits. The average shows that financier-assembler-
wholesalers strongly agreed and further validated by the mean average of 3.14. The result
showed that there is significant difference (0.019) among the different actors. Therefore,
this proves that some of actors share equal benefits.
Almost all of the respondents were undecided in taking more risk than their
buyer except for farmers (40%), wholesalers (36%) and wholesaler-retailers (34%) who
agreed that they take more risk than the buyers. In the average, actors sometimes take
more risk. It is further validated by the mean average of 3.36. The results showed that
there is no significant difference (0.193). Therefore, this proves that the actors were
undecisive taking more risk that their buyer.
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

35

Majority of the respondents are indecisive that buyer derives more benefits while
for farmers (37%), wholesalers (37%) and retailers (33%) agreed in this criteria. The
average implied buyers sometimes derive more benefits.
The response of the different respondents is indicated in the mean average which
is 3.27. The result showed that there was a insignificant difference (0.756). Therefore,

some buyers derive more benefits from their business transaction.

Table 8a. Coordination mechanisms along risk and reward sharing
1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
A. Farmer










1. The buyer and I share the same risks from the
transaction we make.
1
3
10
33
15
50
3
10
1
3
3

2. The buyer and I share equal benefits from the
transaction we make.
0
0
9
30
15
50
5
17
1
3
3

3. I take more risk from the transaction I make with
buyers.
1
3
5
17
10
33
12
40
2
7
3

4. The buyer derives more benefits from the business
operation.
1
3
4
13
10
33
11
37
4
13
3

5. I always control the pricing and grading of chayote.

6
20
8
27
13
43
2
7
1
3
2
B. Assembler-Wholesaler

1. The buyer and I share the same risks from the
transaction we make.
0
0
1
5
8
42
7
37
3
16
4

2. The buyer and I share equal benefits from the
transaction we make.
0
0
3
16
5
26
9
47
2
11
4

3. I take more risk from the transaction I make with
buyers.
0
0
3
16
7
37
6
32
3
16
3

4. The buyer derives more benefits from the business
operation.
0
0
4
21
6
32
5
26
4
21
3

5. I always control the pricing and grading of chayote.

1
5
3
16
8
42
5
26
2
11
3
C. Financier-assembler-wholesaler







1. The buyer and I share the same risks from the
transaction we make.
0
0
1
6
5
31
6
38
4
25
4

2. The buyer and I share equal benefits from the
transaction we make.
0
0
2
13
4
25
5
31
5
31
4

3. I take more risk from the transaction I make with
buyers.
0
0
1
6
11
69
1
6
3
19
3

4. The buyer derives more benefits from the business
operation.
0
0
0
0
10
63
6
38
0
0
3

5. I always control the pricing and grading of chayote.
0
0
3
19
8
50
2
13
3
19
3
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

36

Table 8a. Continued . . .
1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
D. Trucker-Wholesaler

1. The buyer and I share the same risks from the
transaction we make.
1
9
2
18
3
27
2
18
1
9
2

2. The buyer and I share equal benefits from the
transaction we make.
1
9
2
18
5
45
2
18
1
9
3

3. I take more risk from the transaction I make
with buyers.
1
9
4
36
2
18
2
18
2
18
3

4. The buyer derives more benefits from the
business operation.
1
9
3
27
4
36
2
18
1
9
3

5. I always control the pricing and grading of
chayote.
1
9
2
18
1
9
5
45
2
18
3

E. Wholesaler










1. The buyer and I share the same risks from the
transaction we make.
6
43
1
7
3
21
1
7
3
21
3

2. The buyer and I share equal benefits from the
transaction we make.
2
14
3
21
5
36
3
21
1
7
3

3. I take more risk from the transaction I make
with buyers.
3
21
0
0
5
36
5
36
1
7
3

4. The buyer derives more benefits from the
business operation.
3
21
1
7
7
50
2
14
1
7
3

5. I always control the pricing and grading of
chayote.
2
14
2
14
4
29
5
36
1
7
3

F. Wholesaler-Retailer

1. The buyer and I share the same risks from the
transaction we make.
10
29
5
14
11
31
8
23
1
3
3

2. The buyer and I share equal benefits from the
transaction we make.
6
17
4
11
8
23
13
37
4
11
3

3. I take more risk from the transaction I make
with buyers.
1
3
2
6
9
26
11
31
12
34
4

4. The buyer derives more benefits from the
business operation.
2
6
4
11
10
29
13
37
6
17
3

5. I always control the pricing and grading of
0
0
8
23
10
29
12
34
5
14
3
chayote.



Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011


37

Table 8a. Continued . . .
1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
G. Retailer










1. The buyer and I share the same risks from the
transaction we make.
9
19
14
29
12
25
6
13
7
15
3

2. The buyer and I share equal benefits from the
transaction we make.
5
10
13
27
14
29
9
19
7
15
3

3. I take more risk from the transaction I make
with buyers.
3
6
11
23
16
33
12
25
5
10
3

4. The buyer derives more benefits from the
business operation.
4
8
9
19
15
31
16
33
4
8
3

5. I always control the pricing and grading of
2
4
5
10
22
46
13
27
6
13
3
chayote.


Overall results show that majority of the respondents are undecided in the different
criteria in risk and reward sharing. This implied that all of the actors share equal risks; in contrast
to reward sharing where financier-assembler-wholesalers, trucker-wholesalers and wholesaler-
retailers acquires greater benefit. The result validated the idea (Xu and Beamon, 2006) which
describes the characteristics of the selected incentive system. There are two main types of sharing
methods: fair and unfair.
Table 8b. Descriptive and test statistics of risk and reward sharing
CHI-
ASYMP.
STATEMENT
MEAN
SQUARE
DF
SIG.
1. The buyer and I share the same risks from the transaction we make.
2.94
18.52
3
0.000

2. The buyer and I share equal benefits from the transaction we make.
3.14
9.898
3
0.019

3. I take more risk from the transaction I make with buyers.
3.36
4.724
3
0.193

4. The buyer derives more benefits from the business operation.
3.27
1.188
3
0.756

5. I always control the pricing and grading of chayotes.
3.18
12.25
3
0.007

* Moderately significant
** Highly significant
Numerical value and descriptive equivalent
1-1.8 Strongly Disagree
1.9-2.6 Disagree

2.7-3.4 Undecided
3.5-4.2 Agree 4.3-5 Strongly Agree
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

38

Decision Making Style
Centralized decision style. It means that one firm has primary control. Given the level of
responses, from the statement that buyer never influences any decision they make. Majority of the
farmers (70%), assembler-wholesalers (37%), financier-assembler-wholesalers (25%),
wholesalers (29%), wholesaler-retailers were indecisive that buyer never influences decision
actors make. There are respondents from all groups who agreed. Looking into the mean average
(3.06), all the actors indicated indecisiveness to such buyer influences actors make. Statistical test
showed that there is no significant difference. Therefore, buyers sometimes influence the decision
of their supplier.
The second statement validated statement number one whether the seller and buyer jointly

share decision in procurement and delivery schedules reveals. Therefore it
indicated that majority of the respondents were undecided as to this indicator.

Table 9a. Coordination mechanisms along centralized decision style
1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
A. Farmer










1. I decide at my own about the business
operations.
0
0
5
17
4
13
6
20
15
50
4

2. The buyer dictates the decision I should
undertake.
2
7
11
37
13
43
3
10
1
3
3

3. The buyer never influences any decision I
make.
1
3
7
23
21
70
1
3
0
0
3

4. I am the one who decides the volume to be
purchased.
2
7
6
20
7
23
6
20
9
30
3

5. I choose the size/variety/color to be
procured.
1
3
6
20
6
20
6
20
11
37
4

6. We jointly share decision in procurement
0
0
8
27
9
30
10
33
3
10
3
and delivery schedules.
Numerical value and descriptive equivalent
1Strongly Disagree 2 Disagree

3 Undecided
4 Agree 5 Strongly Agree


Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011


39

Table 9a. Continued . . .

1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
B. Assembler-wholesaler

1. I decide at my own about the business
operations.
0
0
0
0
5
26
5
26
9
47
4

2. The buyer dictates the decision I should
undertake.
2
11
3
16
6
32
5
26
3
16
3

3. The buyer never influences any decision I
make.
1
5
5
26
7
37
3
16
3
16
3

4. I am the one who decides the volume to be
purchased.
1
5
3
16
4
21
7
37
4
21
4

5. I choose the size/variety/color to be
procured.
1
5
2
11
3
16
8
42
5
26
4

6. We jointly share decision in procurement
and delivery schedules.
2
11
1
5
2
11
9
47
5
26
4

C. Financier-assembler-wholesaler







1. I decide at my own about the business
operations.
0
0
1
6
4
25
4
25
7
44
4

2. The buyer dictates the decision I should
undertake.
4
25
2
13
7
44
2
13
1
6
3

3. The buyer never influences any decision I
make.
1
6
4
25
4
25
3
19
4
25
3

4. I am the one who decides the volume to be
purchased.
0
0
1
6
3
19
3
19
9
56
4

5. I choose the size/variety/color to be
procured.
0
0
0
0
4
25
3
19
9
56
4

6. We jointly share decision in procurement
and delivery schedules.
1
6
3
19
3
19
5
31
4
25
4

D. Trucker-wholesaler

1. I decide at my own about the business
operations.
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
27
8
73
5

2. The buyer dictates the decision I should
undertake.
4
36
3
27
2
18
0
0
2
18
2

3. The buyer never influences any decision I
make.
2
18
5
45
0
0
1
9
3
27
3

4. I am the one who decides the volume to be
purchased.
0
0
2
18
1
9
0
0
8
73
4

5. I choose the size/variety/color to be
procured.
1
9
1
9
2
18
2
18
5
45
4

6. We jointly share decision in procurement
and delivery schedules.
1
9
1
9
3
27
1
9
5
45
4
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011


40

Table 9a. Continued . . .

1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
E. Wholesaler










1. I decide at my own about the business
operations.
1
7
1
7
1
7
3
21
8
57
4

2. The buyer dictates the decision I should
undertake.
7
50
4
29
2
14
0
0
1
7
2

3. The buyer never influences any decision I
make.
1
7
3
21
4
29
4
29
2
14
3

4. I am the one who decides the volume to be
purchased.
1
7
1
7
1
7
3
21
8
57
4

5. I choose the size/variety/color to be
procured.
1
7
0
0
3
21
3
21
7
50
4

6. We jointly share decision in procurement
and delivery schedules.
5
36
1
7
4
29
3
21
1
7
3

F. Wholesaler-retailer

1. I decide at my own about the business
operations.
0
0
2
6
4
11
7
20
22
63
4

2. The buyer dictates the decision I should
undertake.
8
23
13
37
5
14
4
11
5
14
3

3. The buyer never influences any decision I
make.
3
9
8
23
9
26
6
17
9
26
3

4. I am the one who decides the volume to be
purchased.
0
0
1
3
5
14
7
20
22
63
4

5. I choose the size/variety/color to be
procured.
1
3
2
6
5
14
10
29
17
49
4

6. We jointly share decision in procurement
and delivery schedules.
7
20
9
26
6
17
7
20
6
17
3

G. Retailer










1. I decide at my own about the business
operations.
0
0
1
2
3
6
7
15
37
77
5

2. The buyer dictates the decision I should
undertake.
20
42
12
25
7
15
4
8
5
10
2

3. The buyer never influences any decision I
make.
5
10
13
27
12
25
13
27
5
10
3

4. I am the one who decides the volume to be
purchased.
1
2
2
4
6
13
11
23
28
58
4

5. I choose the size/variety/color to be
3
6
3
6
5
10
12
25
25
52
4
procured.
6. We jointly share decision in procurement
17
35
4
8
10
21
11
23
6
13
3
and delivery schedules.
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

41

Table 9b. Descriptive and test statistics of centralized decision style
CHI-
STATEMENT
MEAN
SQUARE
DF
ASYMP. SIGNIF.
1. I decide at my own about the business operations.

4.33
13.42
3
0.004**
2. The buyer dictates the decision I should undertake.

2.51
11.93
3
0.008**
3. The buyer never influences any decision I make.

3.06
2.873
3
0.417
4. I am the one who decides the volume to be purchased.

4.08
15.54
3
0.001**
5. I choose the size/variety/color to be procured.

3.99
3.74
3
0.291
6. We jointly share decision in procurement and delivery
schedules.
3.08
10.61
3
0.018*
* Moderately significant ** highly significant
Numerical value and descriptive equivalent
1-1.8 Strongly Disagree
1.9-2.6 Disagree

2.7-3.4 Undecided 3.5-4.2 Agree 4.3-5 Strongly Agree

In different criteria under centralized decision style, result shows that respondents agreed
to decide on their own business operations, on the volume to be purchased and choose the
size/variety/color to be procured. Respondents are in doubt if a buyer dictates and influence the
decision they undertake and if actors jointly share decision in procurement and delivery
schedules. As to farm management and operation, decisions were all directed to farmers. For
example in choosing the crop to be planted is influence of supplier/traders, while in marketing
management decisions are influenced and controlled by the supplier/trader.
Decentralized decision style. It means that each firm makes its decisions autonomously.
All of the respondents have their own decision in their business operation. Looking into the
average, all the actors moderately agreed on the statement as further supported with the mean
average. It is further validated by the mean average of 4.01. The result implies that there is
significant difference. Therefore, it confirm that actors have own decision.



Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011


42

Table 10a. Coordination mechanisms along decentralized decision style
STATEMENT
1
2
3
4
5
AVE.
N % N % N % N % N %
A. Farmer










1. I involved other people to decide for me in
selling products and setting the price.

4 13 7 23 9 30 8 27 2
7
3
2. The buyer and I have our own decision.

0
0
0
0 8 27 10 33 12 40
4
B. Assembler-wholesaler

1. I involved other people to decide for me in
selling products and setting the price.

2 11 4 21 3 16 7 37 3 16
3
2. The buyer and I have our own decision.

0
0
2 11 7 37 2 11 8 42
4
C. Financier-assembler-wholesaler

1. I involved other people to decide for me in
selling products and setting the price.

4 25 4 25 3 19 3 19 2 13
3
2. The buyer and I have our own decision.

1
6
3 19 1
6
3 19 8 50
4
D. Trucker-wholesaler

1. I involved other people to decide for me in
selling products and setting the price.

5 45 3 27 1
9
1
9
1
9
2
2. The buyer and I have our own decision.

0
0
1
9 1
9
2 18 7 64
4
E. Wholesaler

1. I involved other people to decide for me in
selling products and setting the price.

5 36 4 29 0
0
2 14 3 21
3
2. The buyer and I have our own decision.

1
7
2 13 4 29 1
7
6 43
4
F. Wholesaler-retailer
1. I involved other people to decide for me in








selling products and setting the price.

11 31 6 17 4 11 7 20 7 20
3
2. The buyer and I have our own decision.

2
6
3
9 4 11 11 31 15 43
4
G. Retailer
1. I involved other people to decide for me in










selling products and setting the price.

22 46 11 23 6 13 8 17 1
2
2
2. The buyer and I have our own decision.

1
2
6 13 5 10 9 19 27 56
4
Numerical value and descriptive equivalent
1 Strongly Disagree
2 Disagree
3 Undecided
4 Agree
5 Strongly Agree


Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

43

Table 10b. Descriptive and test statistics decentralized decision style
STATEMENT
MEAN CHI- SQUARE
DF ASYMP.SIGNI
1. I involved other people to decide for me in
selling products and setting the price.
2.6
12.52
3
0.006**

2. The buyer and I have our own decision.

4.01
1.624
3
0.654
** Highly significant

The second statement validated statement number one whether seller involved
other people in decision making. The result (2.6) indicated that actors were undecided;
hence, they seek advice from other people before making decision.
Level of Control. It can be drawn from the Table 11a that actors monitor buyers in
their procurement/ production/ marketing schedule planned for the farmers (37%),
assembler-wholesalers (32%), financier-assembler-wholesalers (31%) are undecided,
wholesalers (43%), wholesaler-retailers (29%) and retailers (48%) strongly disagree in
monitoring by their buyer while for the trucker-wholesalers strongly agreed in
monitoring. Mean average (2.79) shows that buyers sometimes monitored by the sellers.
The result showed that there is highly significant difference (.001). Therefore, the actors
differ on the statement.
Farmers (21%) and retailers (48%) set rules in their business operation, however
assembler-wholesalers (32%), financier-assembler-wholesalers (31%), trucker-
wholesalers (27%) and wholesalers (21%) are indecisive and wholesaler-retailers (31%)
moderate agreed. On the average they sometimes set rules in their business operation.
It indicated in the mean average 2.99 that the respondents are indecisive in
seeting rules.
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

44

The result implies that there is high significant difference at 0.002, which means

the actors have varied opinions wether they set rules in their business operation or not.

Table 11a. Coordination mechanisms along level of control
STATEMENT
1
2
3
4
5
AVE.
N % N % N % N % N %
A. Farmer










1. I always monitor the buyer on the
procurement/production/marketing
schedules planned.
4 13 7 23 11 37 4 13 4 13
3

2. I set rules in our business operation.

7 21 11 37 6 20 4 13 2 7
2
3. The buyer sets rules in our business
operation
5 15 9 30 11 37 4 13 1 3
3

B. Assembler-wholesaler

1. I always monitor the buyer on the
procurement/production/marketing
schedules planned.
2 11 2 11 6 32 3 16 6 32
3

2. I set rules in our business operation.

2 11 2 11 9 47 2 11 4 21
3
3. The buyer sets rules in our business
operation
3 16 4 21 7 37 2 11 3 16
3

C. Financier-Assembler-Wholesaler

1. I always monitor the buyer on the
procurement/production/marketing
schedules planned.
2 13 2 13 5 31 4 25 3 19
3

2. I set rules in our business operation.

2 13 1 6 5 31 3 19 5 31
4
3. The buyer sets rules in our business
operation
6 38 2 13 4 25 1 6 3 19
3

Numerical value and descriptive equivalent
1 Strongly Disagree
2 Disagree
3 Undecided
4 Agree
5 Strongly Agree


Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

45

Table 11a. Continued. . .
STATEMENT
1
2
3
4
5
AVE.
N % N % N % N % N %
D. Trucker-wholesaler








1. I always monitor the buyer on the
procurement/production/marketing
schedules planned.
2 18
2 18 2 18 2 18 3 27
3

2. I set rules in our business operation.

2 18
3 27 1
9 3 27 2 18
3
3. The buyer sets rules in our business
operation
4 36
5 45 0
0 1
9
1 9
2

E. Wholesaler









1. I always monitor the buyer on the
procurement/production/marketing
scedules planned.
6 43
0
0
3 21 2 14 3 21
3

2. I set rules in our business operation.

3 21
3 21 2 14 3 21 3 21
3
3. The buyer sets rules in our business
operation
7 50
1
7
2 14 1
7
3 21
2

F. Wholesaler-retailer

1. I always monitor the buyer on the
procurement/production/marketing
scedules planned.
10 29
5 14 9 26 2
6
9 26
3

2. I set rules in our business operation.

5 14
5 14 6 17 8 23 11 31
3
3. The buyer sets rules in our business
operation
11 31 11 31 5 14 2
6
6 17
2

G. Retailer

1. I always monitor the buyer on the
procurement/production/marketing
scedules planned.
23 48
8 17 8 17 5 10 4 8
2

2. I set rules in our business operation.

16 33
7 15 6 13 12 25 7 15
3
3. The buyer sets rules in our business
operation
24 50
4
8
6 13 8 17 6 11
2




Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

46

Table 11b. Descriptive and test statistics of level of control
STATEMENT
MEAN CHI- SQUARE DF
ASYMP.SIGNIF
1. I always monitor the buyer on the
procurement/production/marketing
schedules planned.

2.79
16.187
3
0.001**
2. I set rules in our business operation.
2.99
9.797
3
0.002**
3. The buyer sets rules in our business
operation

2.46
3.236
3
0.357
respondent group
2.73
** Highly significance



Numerical value and descriptive equivalent
1-1.8 Strongly Disagree 1.9-2.6 Disagree 2.7-3.4 Undecided 3.5-4.2 Agree 4.3-5 Strongly Agree


Majority farmers, assembler-wholesalers are indecisive in buyer set rules in their
operation however some of the respondents are disagreed so there is no significant
difference among the different actors, average shows that all of the respondents don’t
allows their buyer to set rules for their business operation.

In different criteria in level of control, result shows that respondents are
undecided in monitoring the buyer on the procurement/production/marketing schedules
planned, set rules in our business operation, and buyer sets rules in their business.It
signifies that the levels of control of all respondents are low since they are not much
aware in setting rules in their business operation.

Comprehensive Selection Procedure. Majority of the respondents strongly agreed
that they select buyers who are trustworthy while for wholesalers (43%) and retailers
(33%) strongly disagreed. Looking into the average, majority of all actors indicated that
they select buyers who are trustworthy but some actors said as long as they paid their
products. It is further validated by the mean average of 3.36.
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

47


The result showed that there is high significant difference (0.008) among the
different actors in selecting buyers. Therefore, this showed that some actors differ in the
selection of buyers with respect to trusthworthy.

In the statement that buyers must willingly share market nformation, all the actors
were indecisive and this could be reflected from the statistical test (0.002). Therefore,

they have varied ideas from this condition.

Table 12a. Coordination mechanism along comprehensive selection procedure
1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
A. Farmer










1. I select the buyer who is trustworthy.

0
0
2
7
8
27 11 37
9
30
4
2. The buyer usually choose the sellers with good
quality and adequate volume of chayote.
0
0
3
10
8
27
7
23 12 40
4

3. The buyer usually choose the sellers that offer
lower price of chayote.
2
7
3
10
11 37
4
13 10 33
4

4. I choose buyers whom I know and trade with for
a long, long time.
0
0
1
3
8
27 10 33 11 37
4

5. I choose buyers with adequate resources.

1
3
4
13
7
23 11 37
7
23
4
6. The buyer must willingly share market
information.
0
0
4
13
5
17 13 43
8
27
4

B. Assembler-wholesaler

1. I select the buyer who is trustworthy.

0
0
2
11
4
21
6
32
7
37
4
2. The buyer usually choose the sellers with good
quality and adequate volume of chayote.
1
5
2
11
4
21
6
32
6
32
4

3. The buyer usually choose the sellers that offer
lower price of chayote.
1
5
0
0
2
11
9
47
7
37
4

4. I choose buyers whom I know and trade with for
a long, long time.
1
5
1
5
3
16
8
42
6
32
4

5. I choose buyers with adequate resources.

0
0
3
16
4
21
7
37
5
26
4
6. The buyer must willingly share market
information.
1
5
2
11
7
37
3
16
6
32
4

Numerical value and descriptive equivalent 1 Strongly Disagree

2 Disagree
3 Undecided
4 Agree
5 Strongly Agree
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011


48

Table 12a. Continued . . .
1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
C. Financier-Assembler-Wholesaler






1. I select the buyer who is trustworthy.

1
6
2
13
1
6
5
31
7
44
3
2. The buyer usually choose the sellers with good
quality and adequate volume of chayote.

0
0
2
13
2
13
6
38
6
38
4
3. The buyer usually choose the sellers that offer
lower price of chayote.

1
6
2
13
5
31
6
38
2
13
3
4. I choose buyers whom I know and trade with for
a long, long time.

0
0
2
13
2
13
5
31
7
44
4
5. I choose buyers with adequate resources.

0
0
2
13
4
25
6
38
4
25
4
6. The buyer must willingly share market
information.

1
6
3
19
4
25
4
25
4
25
3
D. Trucker-wholesaler

1. I select the buyer who is trustworthy.

3
27
0
0
2
18
3
27
3
27
3
2. The buyer usually choose the sellers with good
quality and adequate volume of chayote.

0
0
1
9
4
36
2
18
4
36
4
3. The buyer usually choose the sellers that offer
lower price of chayotes.

0
0
0
0
1
9
8
73
2
18
4
4. I choose buyers whom I know and trade with for
a long, long time.

2
18
1
9
1
9
4
36
3
27
3
5. I choose buyers with adequate resources.

2
18
2
18
4
36
2
18
1
9
3
6. The buyer must willingly share market
information.

2
18
1
9
4
36
3
27
1
9
3
E. Wholesaler










1. I select the buyer who is trustworthy.

6
43
2
14
4
29
0
0
2
14
2
2. The buyer usually choose the sellers with good
quality and adequate volume of chayote.

1
7
1
7
4
29
2
14
6
43
4
3. The buyer usually choose the sellers that offer
lower price of chayote.

1
7
0
0
3
21
3
2
7
50
4
4. I choose buyers whom I know and trade with for
a long, long time.

3
21
0
0
5
36
2
14
4
29
3
5. I choose buyers with adequate resources.

4
29
4
29
2
14
2
14
2
14
3
6. The buyer must willingly share market
information.
4
29
2
14
4
29
2
14
2
14
3
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011


49

Table 12a. Continued . . .
1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
% N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
F. Wholesaler-retailer

1. I select the buyer who is trustworthy.

5
14
5
14
5
14
7
20 13
37
4
2. The buyer usually choose the sellers with good
quality and adequate volume of chayote.
3
9
3
9
8
23
5
14 16
46
4

3. The buyer usually choose the sellers that offer
lower price of chayote.
1
3
1
3
5
14
7
20 21
60
4

4. I choose buyers whom I know and trade with for
a long, long time.
1
3
4
11
10 29
6
17 14
40
4

5. I choose buyers with adequate resources.

4
11 12 34
5
14
8
23
6
17
3
6. The buyer must willingly share market
information.
8
23
3
9
11 31
4
11
9
26
3

G. Retailer










1. I select the buyer who is trustworthy.

16 33
6
13
6
13
8
17 12
27
3
2. The buyer usually choose the sellers with good
quality and adequate volume of chayote.
4
8
7
15
7
15 14 29 16
36
4

3. The buyer usually choose the sellers that offer
lower price of chayote.
3
6
6
13
6
13 10 21 23
52
4

4. I choose buyers whom I know and trade with for
a long, long time.
6
13
8
17
11 23 10 21 13
30
3

5. I choose buyers with adequate resources.

11 23 19 40
7
15
4
8
7
16
3
6. The buyer must willingly share market
information.
13 27 11 23
6
13 12 25
6
14
3



Table 12b. Descriptive and test statistics of comprehensive selection procedure
STATEMENT
MEAN
CHI- SQUARE
DF
ASYMP. SIG.
1. I select the buyer who is trustworthy.

3.36
11.798
3
0.008**
2. The buyer usually choose the sellers with good
quality and adequate volume of chayote.
3.79
0.755
3
0.860

3. The buyer usually choose the sellers that offer
lower price of chayote.
3.93
7.824
3
0.050

4. I choose buyers whom I know and trade with for a
long, long time.
3.68
6.496
3
0.090

5. I choose buyers with adequate resources.

3.08
23.71
3
0.000**
6. The buyer must willingly share market information.

3.17
14.404
3
0.002**
** Highly significance
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

50

Socialization
Natural socialization. Table 13a shows that majority of the respondents agreed
that there is a constant communication with their buyer while for wholesalers who are
undecided; the average shows that some of the respondents have their constant
communication. It is further validated by the mean average of 3.97. The result implies
that there is high significant difference (.008). Therefore, this proves that some actors
have a constant communication to their buyer.
It validated statement one and statement two whether respondents established
close personal relationship with their buyer that majority of the respondents agreed in this
criteria.

In natural socialization, respondents agreed that farmers- supplier/ trader have
been trading with the buyer for long period of time. Respondents are undecided
communicate informally, established close personal relationship with the buyer of my

chayote.
Table 13a. Coordination mechanism along natural socialization
1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
A. Farmer










1. The buyer and I have been trading
with the buyer for long period of time.
0
0
2
7
6
20
10
33
12
40
4

2. We constantly communicate
informally.
1
3
4
13
11
37
6
20
8
27
4

3. I have established close personal
relationship with the buyer of my
1
3
6
20
13
43
7
23
3
10
3
chayote.

Numerical value and descriptive equivalent
1 Strongly Disagree
2 Disagree
3 Undecided
4 Agree
5 Strongly Agree
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

51

Table 13a. Continued . . .
1
2
3
4
5
STATEMENT
AVE.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
B. Assembler-wholesaler

1. I transact with the buyer mainly for
business.
0
0
1
5
2
11
7
37
8
42
4

2. I choose the buyer with good
reputation.
1
5
0
0
3
16
9
47
6
32
4

3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.

0
0
0
0
8
42
5
26
6
32
4
C. Financier-Assembler-Wholesaler


1. I transact with the buyer mainly for
business.
0
0
0
0
4
25
1
6
11
69
4

2. I choose the buyer with good
reputation.
1
6
2
13
5
31
2
13
6
38
4

3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.

0
0
1
6
7
44
2
13
6
38
4
D. Trucker-wholesaler

1. I transact with the buyer mainly for
business.
0
0
2
18
0
0
2
18
7
64
4

2. I choose the buyer with good
reputation.
2
18
3
27
1
9
3
27
2
18
3

3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.

0
0
0
0
4
36
3
27
4
36
4
E. Wholesaler










1. I transact with the buyer mainly for
business.
0
0
0
0
1
7
5
36
8
57
4

2. I choose the buyer with good
reputation.
6
43
2
14
3
21
1
7
2
14
2

3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.

1
7
2
14
7
50
1
7
3
21
3
F. Wholesaler-Retailer

1. I transact with the buyer mainly for
business.
0
0
2
6
5
14
4
11
24
69
4

2. I choose the buyer with good
reputation.
5
14
4
11
12
34
5
14
9
26
3

3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.
0
0
4
11
13
37
11
31
7
20
4

G. Retailer

1. I transact with the buyer mainly for
0
0
1
2
7
14
8
17
32
67
4
business.

2. I choose the buyer with good
10
21
12
25
13
27
6
13
7
15
3
reputation.

3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.
0
0
2
4
21
44
14
29
11
23
4

Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

52

Table 13b. Descriptive and test statistics of natural socialization
STATEMENT
CHI-
MEAN
SQUARE
DF
ASYMP.SIG.
1. I transact with the buyer mainly for business.
4.42
0.558
3
0.906
2. I choose the buyer with good reputation.
3.29
20.836
3
0.000**
3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.
3.58
12.272
3
0.007**
** Highly significant
Numerical value and descriptive equivalent
1-1.8 Strongly Disagree
1.9-2.6 Disagree 2.7-3.4 Undecided 3.5-4.2 Agree 4.3-5 Strongly Agree
Deliberate socialization. All of the respondents agreed in transacting buyer mainly
for business average show that actors transact only for their business there are significant
differences (.906) among the different actors.
In choosing buyer, farmers (40%), assembler-wholesalers (32%), financier-
assembler-wholesalers (37%) agreed, trucker-wholesalers , wholesaler-retailer’s and
retailers who are undecided but wholesalers disagreed average shows that some of the
actors sometimes choose buyers so there is insignificant difference among the different
chain actors.
Farmers (53%) , assembler-wholesalers (42%), financier-assembler-wholesalers
(44%), wholesaler (50%), wholesaler-retailers (37%), retailers (44%) are in doubt that
their buyer negotiates with them fairly, but for, and trucker-wholesalers (36%) agreed
average shows in frequency that there are some actors agreed that their buyer negotiates
with them fairly. There is significant difference (.000) among the different chain actors in
these criteria.

Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

53

Table 14a. Coordination mechanism along deliberate socialization
1
2
3
4
5
AVE.
STATEMENT
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%

A. Farmer












1. I transact with the buyer mainly for
business.
0
0
1
3
1
3
10 33
18
60
5

2. I choose the buyer with good reputation.

1
3
2
7
5
17 10 33
12
40
4
3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.

0
0
6
20
16
53
7
23
1
3
3
B. Assembler-wholesaler

1. I transact with the buyer mainly for
business.
0
0
1
5
2
11
7
37
8
42
4

2. I choose the buyer with good reputation.

1
5
0
0
3
16
9
47
6
32
4
3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.

0
0
0
0
8
42
5
26
6
32
4
C. Financier-Assembler-Wholesaler

1. I transact with the buyer mainly for
business.
0
0
0
0
4
25
1
6
11
69
4

2. I choose the buyer with good reputation.

1
6
2
13
5
31
2
13
6
38
4
3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.

0
0
1
6
7
44
2
13
6
38
4
D. Trucker-wholesaler

1. I transact with the buyer mainly for
business.
0
0
2
18
0
0
2
18
7
64
4

2. I choose the buyer with good reputation.

2
18
3
27
1
9
3
27
2
18
3
3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.

0
0
0
0
4
36
3
27
4
36
4
E. Wholesaler










1. I transact with the buyer mainly for
business.
0
0
0
0
1
7
5
36
8
57
4

2. I choose the buyer with good reputation.

6
43
2
14
3
21
1
7
2
14
2
3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.

1
7
2
14
7
50
1
7
3
21
3
F. Wholesaler-Retailer

1. I transact with the buyer mainly for
business.
0
0
2
6
5
14
4
11
24
69
4

2. I choose the buyer with good reputation.
5
14
4
11
12
34
5
14
9
26
3
3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.
0
0
4
11
13
37 11 31
7
20
4
G. Retailer

1. I transact with the buyer mainly for
0
0
1
2
7
14
8
17
32
67
4
business.
2. I choose the buyer with good reputation.
10 21
12
25
13
27
6
13
7
15
3
3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.
0
0
2
4
21
44 14 29
11
23
4
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
/ RONAH LYN S.MEJIA.2011

54

Table 13b. Descriptive and test statistics of natural socialization


STATEMENT
CHI-
MEAN
SQUARE
DF
ASYMP.SIG.
1. I transact with the buyer mainly for business.
4.42
0.558
3
0.906
2. I choose the buyer with good reputation.
3.29
20.836
3
0.000**
3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.
3.58
12.272
3
0.007**
**Highly significant
Numerical value and descriptive equivalent
1-1.8 Strongly Disagree
1.9-2.6 Disagree 2.7-3.4 Undecided 3.5-4.2 Agree 4.3-5 Strongly Agree


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SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
Summary
This study was conducted to determine the coordination mechanisms and
attributes between actors in the spot market chain for chayote. A total of 173 respondents
were interviewed from their respective respondent group: production group ( farmer),
assembly group ( assembler- wholesaler, financier- assembler- wholesaler), distribution
group ( trucker- wholesaler, wholesaler, & wholesaler- retailer ) and retailing group
(retailer) at the La Trinidad Benguet chayote trading post, Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
Balintawak, Nepa Q, Kamuning, Novaliches, Libertad in Metro Manila.
There were 30 farmers under production group; 19 A-Ws and 16 F-A-Ws with a
total of 35 under assembly group; 11 T-Ws, 14 wholesalers and 35 W-Rs with a total of
60 under distribution; and 48 retailers under retailing with a imposing total of 173
respondents. An interview schedule was used as a guide to collect the needed
information. The information was organized, summarized and classified according to the
objective of the study. The descriptive analyses used were: frequency counts, percentage,
average and mean average. Moreover, as to statistical test, chi-square and kruskal-wallis.
There were several different chains for chayote identified. All of the chains
started from the farmers in La Trinidad, Benguet and ended to the different consumers in
La Trinidad, Benguet, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan and Metro, Manila.
Most of the respondents are aged within the bracket of 21-30 and 31-40 years old
and majority is female. Most of them are married and have attained high school and
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
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college level. Majority of the respondents were not affiliated in any organization related
to vegetable trading business and most are engaged one to five years in business.
Most of the respondents were female. Majority of both farmer respondents and
their respective suppliers were married. Almost all of the respondents were catholic. And
most of the respondents was venturing 1-5 years in business.
Regarding resource sharing, in terms of operation, most of the respondents do not
share investments in their business operation. As for strategic resource sharing, actors
have not much acquainted in the strategies to improve their business operation. For the
information sharing, majority of the respondents are undecided in the statement that
actors share production/procurement information (volume, cost, production schedules) to
the buyers and buyer always share market information (demand, supply, prices & cost)
and share information about production and marketing schedules.
For risk and sharing, most of the respondents sometimes have equal sharing of
risks and rewards. When it comes to decision making in decentralized as the different
actors never coordinate decision to be undertaken. In level of control the respondents in
business operation is low.
In comprehensive selection procedure, buyer choose suppliers who offered lower
price and most of the clients of the traders were preferred buyers or ‘suki’ as to they
know and trade them for long time. When in socialization, Most of the respondents
correspond and socialize with their buyers mainly for business.


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Conclusion
Based on the results of the study, the following conclusions were draw
1. There are several chains of chayote in the spot market. It always starts with
the farmers and ends with the consumers.
2. Resource sharing, there was operational resource sharing among the chain actors
particularly to the assembler and the producers. That is the assembler inputs to farmers. However,
to other resource attributes like the strategic resource and information, the chain actors indicated
their individualistic interest for their own business.
3. Risk sharing, all of the actors share equal risks; in contrast to reward sharing
where financier-assembler-wholesalers, trucker-wholesalers and wholesaler derived more
benefits.
4. As to decision style, most of the respondents decide more for themselves about
their business operation. Thus, in some cases, involved other people.
5. The level of control is low, as a result indicated that actors signified
disagreement about the criteria. Therefore, the actors would rather exercise their power to
control over the other actors.

6. Comprehensive selection procedure, all the respondents agree to the different criteria
used in choosing the seller or buyer of chayote.
7. In socialization, communication to buyers is mainly for business.
Recommendation
1. In the decision making, the production and marketing areas ( farmer, assembly,
distribution and retailing ), all the respondents should plan and worked together inorder to
obtain and to improve efficient and effective production and marketing operation
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2. Financier-assembler-wholesalers extend more support to the farmers especially
on financial and other operational resource. To set the level of control on the actors
should strengthen communication between buyers and sellers.
3. To avoid such situation, actors should build business-to-business
relationship (B2B) to strengthen and improve efficient (flow of production) and effective
(transaction). The actors should deal from deliberate and natural socialization in order to
minimize business gaps in business operation


















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61

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
Letter to the Respondents
Benguet State University
COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE
La Trinidad, Benguet

November 2010
Sir/ Madam,

The undersigned fourth year student taking up Bachelor of Science in
Agribusiness majoring in Enterprise Management at Benguet State University is
conducting a researched entitled “COORDINATION MECHANISMS AND
ATTRIBUTES BETWEEN ACTORS IN THE SPOT MARKET CHAINS FOR
CHAYOTE”.

In this connection, I’m soliciting your full cooperation by answering this
questionnaire honestly and completely. I assure you that your answers will be kept
strictly confidential.

Your honest and complete response will make the study successful.

Thank you very much and God bless.



Very truly yours,

RONAH LYN S. MEJIA
Researcher
Noted:

Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
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62


LEOPOLDO N. TAGARINO

Adviser


APPENDIX B
Interview Schedule


This research aims to investigate the fresh chayote supply networks specifically on the
coordination mechanism and attributes adopted in chayote spot market. All information solicited
will be treated with confidentiality. Please answer the questions honestly by putting X mark in the
appropriate space provided for. Thank you very much!
Respondent’s Name: __________________________
No. ______

[ ] Farmers




[ ] Wholesaler
[ ] Assembler-Wholesaler


[ ] Wholesaler-Retailer
[ ] Financier- Assembler-Wholesaler [ ] Retailers

[ ] Trucker-Wholesaler
A. RESPONDENT’S PROFILE

A.1 Age___________


A.2 Gender: _____ Female
_____ Male

A.3 Marital status: ___ Single
___ Married
___ Separated ___ Widowed

A.4 Educational Attainment
___ No formal education

___ College undergraduate
___ Elementary graduate

___ College graduate
___High school undergraduate

___ Vocational/technical graduate


___ High school graduate

___ Postgraduate
A.5 Number of years engaged in cabbage farming business: _________________
A.6 Other sources of income: ________________________
Ave. monthly income: _________________________
A.8 Organizational affiliation:
___ Farmers’ association
___ Cooperatives






___ Others, specify ____________
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63

B. COORDINATION MECHANISMS
A. Assess the coordination mechanisms adopted in dealing with the buyers of your
chayote.
B.1 Resource Sharing Structure - how the buyer and the seller share resources such as
information and
capital in the business operation.




B.1.1 Operational resource sharing - resources shared are capital, facilities, equipment in the
business operation.















1 2 3 4 5
1. I invest large amount of capital in my business operation.








Not at all
Very much

2. Buyer supports me for specific production investments.










Not at all
Very much

3. I share information about my production/procurement operation.








Not at all
Very much

4. Buyer always shares marketing information.

Not at all
Very much

5. The buyer and I jointly make production and marketing decisions.








Not at all
Very much

B.1.2 Strategic resource sharing - the buyer and the sellé make or plan for actions to achieve
or improve their goals.
















1 2 3 4 5

1. The buyer and I have established good business partnership.










Not at all
Very much
2. The buyer and I jointly formulate production and marketing strategies.








Not at all
Very much
3. We jointly share investment to attain our business goals.









Not at all
Very much
4. We plan strategies to improve our the business operation.









Not at all
Very much
5. We always communicate sharing information about our business operation.







Not at all
Very much
B.1.3 Information Sharing - the buyer and the seller share marketing/ production information.



















1 2 3 4 5
1. I share production information (volume, cost, production
schedules) to the buyers.


Not at all
Very much
2. The buyer always share market information
(demand, supply, prices and cost).

Not at all
Very much

3. We share information about production and
marketing schedules.




Not at all
Very much
4. The buyer and I jointly make production and
marketing decisions.




Not at all
Very much
Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
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64

5. The buyer and I have constant business communication.









Not at all
Very much
C. Risk and Reward Sharing - the buyer and the seller share risk and reward sharing/ benefits
fairly or unfairly.


















1 2 3 4 5

1. The buyer and I share the same risks from the transaction
we make.




Not at all
Very much
2. The buyer and I share equal benefits from the
transaction we make.




Not at all
Very much
3. I take more risk from the transaction I make with buyers.









Not at all
Very much
4. The buyer derives more benefits from the business operation.









Not at all
Very much
5. The buyer controls the pricing and grading of chayotes.










Not at all
Very much
D. Decision Style - how trhe actors decide in their operation.

D.1. Centralized- one actor has primary control in their operation or buyer and seller jointly have
control.









1 2 3 4 5
1. I decide at my own about the business operations.
Not at all
Very much
2. The buyer dictates the decision I should undertake.
Not at all
Very much












3. The buyer never influences any decision I make. Not at all
Very much
4. We jointly share decision in procurement and delivery schedules.









Not at all
Very much
5. I am the one who sets the price .


Not at all
Very much
6. I am the one who decides how many cabbage to purchase.








Not at all
Very much
7. I am the one who decides what variety to purchase. Not at all
Very much
D.2. Decentralized- the buyer and the seller have control or other party have control.









1 2 3 4 5
1. I involved other people to decide for me in
selling products and setting the price.
Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree
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2. The buyer and I have our own decision. Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree







E. Level of Control- the buyer or the seller have high or low control























1 2 3 4 5
1. I always abide by the target agreement.
Not at all
Very much
2. The buyer decides as to the procurement and selling schedules.










Not at all
Very much
3. The buyer controls the pricing and grading of chayotes.










Not at all
Very much
4. I am flexible to my procurement and delivery schedules.










Not at all
Very much
5. I follow the procurement and delivery schedules.











Not at all
Very much
F. Comprehensive Selection Procedures














1 2 3 4 5
1. I select the buyer who is trustworthy.


Not at all
Very much
2. The buyer must demonstrate effective cooperation. Not at all
Very much
3. I choose buyers with adequate resources.
Not at all
Very much
4. The buyer extend credit assistance in the
production/procurement of chayotes.


Not at all
Very much
5. The buyer must willingly share market information.
Not at all
Very much
G. Socialization

G.1 Natural Socialization
















1 2 3 4 5
1. The buyer and I have been trading with the buyer for long

period of time.




Not at all
Very much
2. We constantly communicate informally.
Not at all
Very much
3. I have established close personal relationship with
the buyer of my chayotes.


Not at all
Very much

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66

G.2. Deliberate Socialization















1 2 3 4 5
1. I transact with the buyer mainly for business.

Not at all
Very much
2. I choose the buyer with good reputation.
Not at all
Very much
3. The buyer negotiates with me fairly.


Not at all
Very much




Coordination Mechanisms and Attributes between Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
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Document Outline

  • Coordination Mechanisms and Attributesbetween Actors in the Spot Market Chains for Chayote
    • BIBLIOGRAPHY
    • ABSTRACT
    • INTRODUCTION
    • REVIEW OF LITERATURE
    • METHODOLOGY
    • RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
    • SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
    • LITERATURE CITED
    • APPENDICES